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Long-run Risk-Adjusted Performance of IPOs
in the Life Insurance Industry
Lal C. Chugh and Joseph W. Meador °
Introduction
The pace of demutualization among major U.S. life insurance companies increased
sharply after the mid-1990s. Five of the fifteen largest U.S. life insurers demutualized between
1997 and 2001, and the largest, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, demutualized in 2000.
Ten other major life insurance companies, with total assets in 2003 of $775 billion, demutualized
over the same time period. The regulatory and competitive environment in the life insurance
industry has changed dramatically in recent years. These changes include: (1) the fact that
consumers have shown declining interest in the traditional life insurance products of risk bearing
and transfer, while revenues from the wealth management and annuity business have offered new
growth opportunities; (2) deregulation of the financial services industry, culminating in passage
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which demolished the traditional barriers between
commercial banking, insurance, and investment banking; (3) changes in the Internal Revenue
Code that eliminated the tax advantages of a mutual insurer; and finally, (4) increasing interest
shown by foreign life insurance companies in the U.S. market. Demutualization has been
undertaken by many mutual life insurance companies as a strategic response to deal with these
numerous changes in the financial services market. This study focuses on the long-run
performance of life insurance IPOs issued pursuant to demutualization and compares the
performance of these IPOs to the performance of several market indexes.
The Process of Demutualization via IPO
Demutualization is the process of converting a mutual life insurance company, which is
owned by its policyholders, into a publicly traded stock company owned by shareholders,
pursuant to a plan of conversion approved by policyholders and state regulators.
There are two categories of demutualization: partial and full demutualization. Partial
demutualization, commonly called the Iowa method, is accomplished by the formation of a
mutual holding company (MHC) which owns at least 50.1% of a newly formed subsidiary stock
insurance company. In the Iowa method, policyholder interests are automatically converted into
membership interests in the MHC, while the policy contracts are transferred to the stock
subsidiary. Policyholders do not receive any distribution of accumulated surplus. Policyholders,
regulators and investors generally have not been satisfied with this method of conversion since
policyholders lose control of the operating subsidiary and management is not accountable to
investors and the capital markets.
A full demutualization can be accomplished in one of two ways – (1) the subscription
method (commonly called the Illinois/Pennsylvania method), or (2) the New York method,
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whereby surplus is fully transferred to policyholders. In the Illinois/Pennsylvania method,
non-transferable subscription rights are given to the policyholders. These subscription rights
allow the policyholders to make cash purchases of stock in the company, but policyholders
do not get any compensation from the company in either cash or stock. These rights to
purchases are perishable and have no market value. This method does not deplete surplus
and allows for accessing cash resources from the existing policyholders. However, this
method is controversial and may invite policyholder lawsuits. Only a few states have statutes
requiring this method of conversion.
The New York method of full demutualization, the method of conversion required in
most states, is where the policyholders receive stock, cash and/or policy credits for their
ownership rights in the mutual organization. This method of conversion has been the most
widely used in the recent past.
As an example of full demutualization using the New York method, the Prudential
Insurance Company, which demutualized in 2001, created and then distributed 454.6 million
shares directly to policyholders. In addition, it sold 110 million shares to the public at $27.50
per share. Part of the $3 billion in proceeds was paid to cash-out small policyholders and to
other policyholders choosing not to receive shares of stock in the new company.
This study analyzes the stock market performance of IPOs of life insurers which have
gone through full demutualization using the New York method. There are several reasons
for choosing this population for study:
First, under the New York method of
demutualization, accumulated surplus is fully transferred to the policyholders through the
creation of new, marketable securities. Second, other methods of demutualization are
controversial and litigious, and have not received widespread regulatory approval. Finally, in
the New York method of full demutualization, management does become accountable to
shareholders and the financial markets, and this does not happen in the other methods of
demutualization.
Previous Literature
This section firstly reviews the literature regarding performance of IPOs in general.
And then, we discuss the performance associated with the different forms of corporate
governance in the insurance industry.
Previous Research on IPOs. It is a well-established phenomenon (Ritter and Welch 2002)
that IPOs are characterized by three definite patterns: (1) short-run underpricing, (2) hot
issue markets, meaning that sometimes IPOs are very hot and therefore outperform the
market in the short-run, and (3) long-run underperformance of IPOs compared with market
and industry benchmarks. This latter finding generally holds true in the U.S. and across the
international financial markets.
The reasons for long-run underperformance of IPOs have been the subject of
considerable research by several authors. The various reasons set forth are: constraints on
shorting IPOs and the presence of heterogeneous expectations (Miller 1977; Gao, Mao and
Zhong 2006), high-volume waves of IPOs saturating the markets (Schultz 2001), institutional
flipping (Kraigman, et. al. 1999), optimistic accounting in the early life of the firm (Teoh,
Welch and Wong 1998), and over-confidence of the entrepreneurs and investors in the early
stages of the firms (Bermado and Welch 2001; Daniel, Hershleifer and Subrahmanyam
1998).
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However, IPOs in some industries and in some cases have provided excess returns
over the long-run. For example REITS (Buttimer, Hyland and Sander 2005) and banks in
India (Gosh 2005) have provided excess returns. Also, Fernando, Krishnamurthy and Spindt
(2004), find a positive signaling effect of share-price level on long-run performance.
It is worth noting that Jain and Kinnai (1994), and Mikkelson, Partch and Shah
(1997), find evidence that IPO long-run underperformance is associated with poor financial
accounting/operating performance. Also, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) set forth evidence
that management quality is associated with positive long-run performance. Finally, an
aggressive change in management strategy, resulting in measurable improvement in key
indicators of operating performance, can result in superior long-run performance (Gosh
2005).
Previous Research on Governance in the Insurance Industry. Most of the previous research
has focused on accounting and operating performance in the insurance industry rather than
IPO and stock performance. Boose (1990) and Cummins (1999) find that stock life
insurance companies demonstrate greater efficiency in operations than mutual insurers.
Similarly, demutualized life insurance firms have demonstrated cost efficiency gains when
contrasted with their prior operations as mutuals (McNamara and Rhee 1992).
The above studies, in general, have tended to focus on accounting performance and
have used older time periods. Additionally, these studies do not distinguish between full and
partial demutualizations. Other studies regarding characteristics of demutualizing firms use
mixed samples of life and non-life insurance companies (Viswanathan and Cummins 2003).
Meador and Chugh (2006) examine pre- and post-IPO strategic and operating
performance of life insurance companies, using a recent time period, and a sample of firms
which have gone through full demutualization using the New York Method. They find that
the newly stockicized firms implemented thoroughgoing and widespread changes in strategy
after demutualization.
The new strategy emphasized higher growth, greater cost
effectiveness, higher risk in asset management, and a shift in product mix towards wealth and
pension funds management businesses and away from traditional life insurance products,
resulting in consistently higher rates of profitability.
Sample and Methodology
This paper examines major life insurance firms that have recently demutualized and
compares their post-IPO stock performance to the returns of several market indexes. The
study identifies eleven dominant U.S. and Canadian life insurance companies that
demutualized via IPO between 1997 and 2001. These firms have about 20 percent of the
U.S. life insurance revenue market. The names of these companies and their corresponding
year of IPO are described in Exhibit 1.
We calculate three-year compounded annual rates of return for each company’s stock
price, starting from the closing price on the first day of issue. Computations are not based on
the offer price; in this way, most of the one-day underpricing that typically exists in IPOs is
eliminated. Correspondingly, three-year compounded annual rates of return for various
market indexes—S&P 500 index, DJIA and the NASDAQ 75-company Insurance Index—
have been calculated.
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The study also computes long-run risk adjusted rates of return for the life insurance
IPOs and market indexes using the Sharpe and Sortino ratios, as described below. The
Sharpe ratio, the standard measure of risk-adjusted performance (Sharpe 1966), computes the
excess returns over the risk free rate for the sample period, normalized by the standard
deviation of each company for that period. The Sortino ratio, on the other hand, uses only
the deviations below the required minimum acceptable rate of return (RMAR), as opposed to
the total series standard deviation used in the Sharpe ratio, and thus is a more stringent
measure of risk adjusted performance. It calculates riskiness of returns lower than a required
minimum acceptable rate of return (RMAR) and does not incorporate returns above the
RMAR.
As each company has its own date/month of demutualization, therefore each company
has a unique set of 36-months’ data and a corresponding set of risk-free rates of return, and a
set of rates of return for the market indexes.
The Sharpe ratio is calculated as follows:
Sharpe ratio = Ri – Ri / σi

(Equation 1)

where Ri = is the average monthly return (36 observations) on the stock price for company i,
Rf is the average 30-day T-bill rate for each corresponding month,
σi is the standard deviation of the series of monthly company returns.
The Sortino Ratio (Sortino and Forsey 1996) is calculated as follows:
Sortino Ratio = (Compound Period Return - RMAR ) ÷ DDMAR

(Equation 2)

DDMAR = [ (S(LI)2 ) ÷ N ] 1/2
Where L = (R I - RMAR )
[if R I - RMAR < 0] or 0 [if RI – RMAR ≥ 0]
RI = Return for period I
N = Number of Periods
RMAR = Require Minimum Acceptable Rate of Return
DDMAR = Downside Semi-Deviation
The RMAR, or required minimum acceptable rate of return, is set at zero in our study.
This standard is considered the most relevant, as life insurance policyholders who become
shareholders are likely to be highly risk averse, intolerant of negative returns and more
interested in the preservation of principal, rather than maximization of returns.
Discussion of Results
Contrary to a well-established body of literature regarding long-run
underperformance of IPOs and portfolios of IPOs, our results demonstrate that there have
been superior long-run performance of the IPOs of demutualizing life insurance companies.
The results are reported in exhibits two through five in two parts: stock price performance
and risk-adjusted returns.

Journal of the Academy of Finance:

Stock price performance. The study finds that ten of the eleven life insurance IPOs had
positive, three-year, compounded annual rates of return, as shown in Exhibit 2. In contrast,
the DJIA had six cases of negative returns, and the S&P 500 Index had seven reported cases
of negative returns for the corresponding time periods. Secondly, the equally weighted
portfolio of the IPO stocks of these firms demonstrated substantial excess returns over the
indexes (Exhibit 3). This portfolio had a 144 percent average annual return in excess of
DJIA and a 176 percent average annual return over the S&P 500 index. At the same time,
this portfolio had average annual excess returns of 35 percent above the industry benchmark,
the NASDAQ Insurance Company Index. Thirdly, these excess returns are widespread: nine
of the eleven demutualized firms outperformed the S&P 500 Index and eight exceeded the
returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Moreover, six of the eleven bested the returns
of the industry benchmark, the NASDAQ Insurance Company Index.
Risk-adjusted returns. The study finds that the life insurance IPOs also earned consistently
higher risk-adjusted rates of return. First, as reported in Exhibit 4, nine of the eleven life
insurance companies had higher Sharpe ratios (Equation 1) than the Sharpe measures for the
S&P 500 Index. (Parametric tests of significance for the Sharpe and Sortino ratios do not
exist, as was also noted by the anonymous reviewer.) Also, seven of the IPOs had higher
Sharpe ratios than those for the NASDAQ Insurance Index. Secondly, as reported in Exhibit
5, nine firms had higher Sortino ratios (Equation 2) than the similar ratios for the S&P 500
Index. Similarly, seven IPOs had higher Sortino ratios than the Sortino ratios of the
NASDAQ Insurance Index. Thirdly, the average risk-adjusted returns on equally weighted
portfolios of life insurance IPOs exceeded the returns of the S&P 500 Index and the
NASDAQ Insurance Company Index, as measured by both the Sharpe and the Sortino ratios
(Exhibits 4 and 5).
Summary and Conclusion
The literature documents the general long-run underperformance of IPOs and the
reasons for this phenomenon. These reasons are noted above in the literature review section
of this paper. It is also documented that IPO underperformance generally is associated with
poor financial/operating performance. In contrast, our study demonstrates that the IPOs of
life insurance firms using the New York method of full demutualization achieved superior
long-run returns, compared with the various market indexes. Similarly risk adjusted returns
of these IPOs outperformed those of the market indexes as measured by both the Sharpe and
Sortino ratios. This superior performance was widespread and consistent amongst the
sample companies. The authors of this paper believe that reasons for the superior
performance of these IPOs may be due to changes in strategies related to product
composition, markets and operations. A paper by Meador and Chugh (2006), which
investigates the pre- and post-IPO operating performance and strategies of demutualizing life
insurance companies, finds that the newly stockicized companies achieved gains in cost
efficiency and higher profitability. The growth rates of such companies were higher. The
companies shifted product focus toward wealth and pension fund management and away
from traditional life insurance products. The management of such companies also was
willing to take higher risks in asset and debt management. The authors believe, and this is

Chugh and Meador – Long-Run Risk Adjusted Performance

supported by their conversations with industry executives, that the management in the
stockicized life insurance firms becomes more accountable to stockholders and strives for
higher stock prices, forsaking past patterns of the expense preference behavior associated
with mutuals. The stock form of organization also enhances transparency of operations and
adds to the option value of the stock by enabling these firms to engage in follow-on mergers
and acquisitions.
Exhibit 1
Companies Included in the Study and Their Year of IPO
Company Name
AmerUS Life Insurance
Company
Canada Life Assurance
Company
John Hancock Life
Insurance Company
Manufacturers Life
Insurance Company
Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company
MONY Life Insurance
Company

Year
of IPO
1997

Company Name

Year
of IPO
2001

Phoenix Life Insurance
Company
Principal Life Insurance
Company
Prudential Insurance
Company of America
Standard Insurance
Company
Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada

1999
2000
1999
2000

1998
2000
1999
2000

1998

Exhibit 2
Compound Annual Rates of Return Post-Demutualization
Company Name

Month and Year of
IPO

AmerUS
Canada Life
John Hancock
Manufacturer’s
Life
Metropolitan
MONY
Phoenix
Principal
Prudential
Standard
Insurance
Sun Life

January 1997
December 2001
January 2000
September 1999

Company
Returns

S&P 500
Index

6.58
3.18
16.5
21.03

Dow
Jones
Industrial
Average
19.06
2.37
-9.71
-9.78

23.07
1.82
-15.00
-14.02

NASDAQ
Insurance
Company
Index
9.46
12.62
8.43
3.00

June 2000
November 1998
June 2001
October 2001
December 2001
April 1999

10.53
0.41
-13.00
18.82
18.31
34.46

-4.90
2.62
-0.21
3.38
2.47
-2.67

-12.50
-0.70
-2.33
2.19
1.82
-6.05

13.05
10.42
10.46
10.62
12.61
6.46

March 2000

20.21

-9.89

-17.28

4.92
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Exhibit 3
Compound Annual Excess Rates of Return
Company Name
AmerUS
Canada Life
John Hancock
Manufacturer’s Life
Metropolitan
MONY
Phoenix
Principal
Prudential
Standard Insurance
Sun Life
Total Excess
Return

Excess
Returns
over DJIA
-12.48
0.81
26.21
30.81
15.43
-2.21
-12.79
15.44
15.84
37.13
30.10
144.29

Excess
Returns
over S&P
500 Index
-16.49
1.36
31.50
35.05
23.03
1.11
-10.67
16.63
16.49
40.51
37.49
176.01

Excess Returns
over NASDAQ
Insurance
Company Index
-2.88
-9.44
8.07
18.03
-2.52
-10.01
-23.46
8.20
5.70
28.00
15.29
34.98

Exhibit 4
Risk-adjusted Measures of Performance:
Sharpe Ratio
Company Name

Company
Sharpe
Ratio

S&P 500
Sharpe
Ratio

AmerUS
Canada Life
John Hancock
Manufacturer’s Life
Metropolitan
MONY
Phoenix
Principal
Prudential
Standard Insurance
Sun Life
Average

0.009
0.220
0.156
0.179
0.114
0.011
-0.062
0.308
0.307
0.306
0.170
0.156

0.268
-0.280
-0.277
-0.272
-0.223
-0.066
-0.043
0.037
0.030
-0.172
-0.337
-0.121

NASDAQ
Insurance
Company Index
—Sharpe Ratio
0.056
0.106
0.106
0.007
0.215
0.107
0.238
0.245
0.281
0.057
0.052
0.134
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Exhibit 5
Sortino (semi-deviation) Risk-adjusted Measures of Performance:
RMAR Equals 0
Company Name

Company
Ratio

S&P Ratio

AmerUS
Canada Life
John Hancock
Manufacturer’s Life
Metropolitan
MONY
Phoenix
Principal
Prudential
Standard Insurance
Sun Life
Average

0.095
0.779
0.437
0.514
0.292
0.086
-0.081
0.651
0.700
0.703
0.410
0.417

0.614
-0.361
-0.361
-0.332
-0.283
0.023
-0.028
0.100
0.088
-0.172
-0.431
-0.104

Insurance
Index
Ratio
0.229
0.330
0.330
0.141
0.509
0.393
0.532
0.528
0.619
0.254
0.207
0.370
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